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Abstract
Various empirical works have shown that dispersion of rm-level protability is signi-
cantly countercyclical. I incorporate rmstechnology adoption decision into rm dynamics
model with business cycle features to explain these empirical ndings both qualitatively and
quantitatively. The option of endogenous exiting and credit constraint jointly play an im-
portant role in motivating rmsrisk taking behavior. The model predicts that relatively
small sized rms are more likely to take risk, and that the dispersion measured as the vari-
ance/standard deviation of rm-level protability is larger in recessions, which are consistent
to the data.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty rises in bad times. Recently, this phenomenon attracts growing attention of econo-
mists, with numerous new evidences from individual level data sets1. However, this signicantly
negative correlation between uncertainty and aggregate economic condition is often treated as a
calibration discipline, while not many works have been done to explain it.
In this paper, I provide a possible mechanism through which the worsened aggregate economic
condition leads to an increase in the measured dispersion in individual level productivity. The
model at work stands close to the standard industry dynamic model with rm entry and exit
built in the seminal work Hopenhayn (1992), with aggregate uctuations in terms of "technology
shocks" as the driving force of model dynamics, which is also a standard approach in real business
cycles literature. Meanwhile, it di¤ers from the standard in that in each period, after observing
the aggregate "technology realization", a staying rm has the option to adopt a risky technology,
in addition to the standard safe technology whose productivity realization is determined by the
aggregate state. Given the same capital input, the output and productivity associated to the
risky technology is a mean-preserving spread of the safe ones output and productivity. Although
rms are risk neutral and the risky technology does not give higher ow payo¤, there is a positive
fraction of rms that strictly prefer to take the risk. This is because the option of exit provides
a lower bound to a rms continuation value as a function of working capital and creates a local
convexity in it. Therefore, rms in this region have the incentive to randomize over their future
values by choosing the risky technology, and when the uncertain productivity realizes, dispersion
arises. This setup resembles Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn (2009) on occupational choice. In
bad times, this region gets larger and the fraction of risky rms then gets larger. Consequently,
the average or aggregate riskiness in rmsproduction increases, so does the realized productivity
dispersion. Despite the model is only a standard one with a little twist, it is capable of generating
productivity dispersion negatively correlated to aggregate state, with the correlation coe¢ cient in
line with data.
This models mechanism is also strongly motivated by empirical ndings. It has features and
implications that mirror the following observations: (1) new rms are relatively small and small
rms have low survival rate; (2) small and/or young rms tend to bear more risk and/or show larger
productivity dispersion; (3) business cycles indicators lead the change in productivity dispersion;
and (4) in recessions, more rms become risky and this increases exit rate.
The rst two points are closely related, as the exit hazard is a special form of rm level
1Examples are Higson, Holly and Kattuman (2002), Higson, Holly, Kattuman and Platis (2004), Bloom (2009),
Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2010), Bachmann and Bayer (2011), Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2009), Bachmann,
Elstner and Sims (2011), Chugh (2010), Kehrig (2011), to name a few.
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risk. The relation between rm size and dynamics is well established and can be dated back
to, for example, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988). This is further discussed in Section
2. The ndings on rm size and riskiness mainly come from two directions. Firstly, it is well
established in the entrepreneurship literature that entrepreneurs, especially poorer ones, bear
substantial amount of risk and tend to hold largely undiversied assets by investing heavily in
their own rms, despite no or little premium in doing so. The risk here is interpreted as either
the dispersion in small rm ownerspersonal income, or dispersion in return to private equity.
At the same time, privately owned businesses are on average smaller in scale, measured in either
capital stock, number of employees, or output2. The second stream of empirical ndings, more
relevant to my work, regards the productivity and rm size di¤erential. Gertler and Gilchrist
(1991), using the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, nd that smaller
rms exhibit higher standard deviation in sales growth rates than larger ones do. Dhawan (2001)
looks at publicly traded rms in COMPUSTAT and nd that small rms have higher failure
rate and larger standard deviation in prot rate, while conditional on surviving, small rms show
higher average prot rate. The superior protability in small rms reduces if adjusted according
to the failure rates. Here, Dhawan denes the prot rate as operating income per unit of capital,
and he denes the rm-level riskiness or volatility as the variance in the random realizations of
production. Using his denitions, my model generates the same pattern of prot rate and riskiness
di¤erential in size. There is also evidence from outside U.S.. For example, utilizing German data
set USTAN, Bachmann and Bayer (2011) nd decreasing productivity risk in rm size, where the
risk is measured as average cross-sectional standard deviation in log-di¤erences in rm-level Solow
residuals.
The latter two points are on the cyclical change. Increase in measured cross-sectional dispersion
lags the worsened business cycles indicator, for example, GDP growth rate, as shown in Bachmann,
Elstner and Sims (2011) and Kehrig (2011) among others. Similar response is observed on the
stock market. The last point relates to the key feature of the model. Although unfortunately I do
not have direct observation from the data, there are indirect evidences that imply a larger fraction
of risky rms in recessions consisting of mainly small rms. Exit rate raises in bad times. The
ndings on the relation between rm size and exit rate show that small rms and establishments
drive the negative correlation between exit rate and business cycles. This indicates that small
rms are more sensitive to the cyclical change, as the model predicts. The increased exit rate in
bad times is shown in Section 2. A maybe more direct evidence is from Bachmann and Moscarini
(2011), who nd higher frequency of price adjustments during recessions, which is interpreted as
2Examples for works dedicated in this direction are Barton H. Hamilton (2000), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), and Herranz, Krasa and Villamil (2009). See Quadrini (2009) for a detailed review.
2
more of risky pricing experiments of the rms.
The goal of this paper is to complement existing theories. It is true that, if there is causality
between measured uncertainty and aggregate economic condition, the direction can be either. The
real option literature that aims at explaining such countercyclicality suggests the opposite direction
of causal relationship, from increased uncertainty to decline in aggregate economic activity. An
inuential paper dedicated in this direction is Bloom (2009), which is later generalized by Bloom
et. al. (2009). Bloom shows that increased uncertainty, through the channel of adjustment
costs to capital and labor, leads to larger option value of waiting and a pause in investment
and employment. A sizable drop in aggregate economic activity occurs because of this "wait-
and-see" e¤ect. The time varying uncertainty is twofold in his model: (1) time series standard
deviation of productivity can be either high or low, evolving as a Markov process, and (2) the one-
step-ahead conditional variance of this Markov process depends on current realization. However,
Bachmann and Bayer (2011) and Bachmann, Elstner and Sims (2011) show that there is little
evidence of sizeable "wait-and-see" e¤ects in data. In addition, the process of entry and exit is
neglected. Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2009) do consider the entry and exit dynamics that interact
with nancial constraints, but, again, the causal direction is from time series uncertainty shock to
a sizeable response in aggregate variable.
The uncertainty shock is indeed important and the inverted causality may still work, but there
is an issue regarding measuring uncertainty, which relates to the lead-lag relationship between
uncertainty and cycles. Time series variances of major business condition indicators are often
interpreted as uncertainty. In addition, a parallel family of uncertainty measures regards the
realized cross-sectional dispersion in individual level performances, which include, among others,
cross-sectional variance in measured rm-level total factor productivities, levels or growth rates,
and sales growth rates. However, realized cross-sectional dispersion not only lags the aggregate
cycles, but is also a controversial measure of uncertainty about future, which in turn casts more
doubts on the argument that it is the increased uncertainty that leads to worsened economic
activity3.
The other paper that entertains the same causal direction as mine is Bachmann and Moscarini
(2011). They build a model in which rms need to run costly experimentation and hence learn
about their own market powers. As a result of lower experimentation costs, the dispersion of
productivity measured in sales is larger during recessions due to more experimentations conducted.
My model shares a similar feature with theirs, in that the option of exiting promotes the risky
performance of rms. At the same time, my model di¤ers from theirs by predicting that smaller
rms are the major driving force of countercyclical productivity and entry/exit dynamics. In this
3Bloom (2009) and Bloom et. al. (2010) are two representative examples.
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paper, I incorporate rmstechnology adoption decision into an otherwise standard rm dynamics
model with business cycle features. The main feature of this model is that, conditional on staying,
an operating rm can choose from two di¤erent types of technology: a safe one, and a risky one
with no risky premium. The option of exiting naturally forms a lower bound on the value of a
rm, and therefore provides a certain degree of incentive on risk taking behavior on the margin
resulting from the convexity of the value function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stylized facts on cyclical
dispersion of productivity, rm size distribution and dynamics. Section 3 contains a simple three-
period model that illustrates the mechanism and shows preliminary results. Section 4 takes the
simple model into innite horizon. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Facts
Cyclical Productivity Dispersion. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) use data from COMPUS-
TAT and nd countercyclical movement of dispersion in Tobins q. At the same time, they show a
similar pattern for dispersion of total factor productivity growth rates at four digit SIC level, with
correlation being  0:465. Bloom (2009) shows that the US stock market volatility measured as
VXO index is positively correlated to the cross-sectional standard deviations of rm prot growth,
rm stock return, and industrial TFP growth at four digit SIC level, but its correlation with indus-
trial production is signicantly negative. Moreover, Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2010) take
an even closer look at this issue and examine the Census of Manufactures, and nd that various
measures of uncertainty are signicantly countercyclical at all of establishment, rm, industry,
and aggregate levels. Bachmann and Bayer (2009a, 2009b) take a long panel of German rm-level
micro-data that covers all single digit industries, and show that the correlation between dispersion
in growth rates of rm-level TFP, sale, and value added and economic performance is signicantly
negative. This pattern preserves in subsamples divided by sector and by size. Although a di¤erent
economy, their USTAN data set has the clear advantage in coverage. Moreover, by looking at dif-
ferent size quantiles, they document that time series averaged productivity dispersion in smaller
rms tend to be larger than bigger rms. Chugh (2010) explores the protability series con-
structed by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) from Longitudinal Research Database and calculates
the cyclical correlation between average productivity and the dispersion to be  0:97. However,
the sample is of relatively short length as annual data and covers only 1977-1988, a period that
exhibits unusually large degree of opposite movement according to my own approximation. Kehrig
(2011) focuses more on the dispersion of productivity levels rather than prot rates. He looks at
the establishment-level data of the US manufacturing sector that consists of the Annual Survey
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Figure 1: Cyclical Indicators and Variances in TFP. Upper panel plots di¤erent cyclical indica-
tors, Real GDP (dotted line), Real total manufacturing output (solid line), Average TFP across
industries at SIC 4 Digit level (dashed line). Lower panel shows cyclical behavior of TFP disper-
sion measured as variance (solid line with dots), together with Average TFP (dashed line). All
series are HP-ltered. The shaded bars illustrate o¢ cial NBER recessions. Real GDP data is
from FRED; TFP series are from MIPD, and so is Manufacturing output measured as Real Total
Shipment.
of Manufactures, Census of Manufactures, Plant Capacity Utilization Survey, and Longitudinal
Business Database. Though the manufacturing sector as a whole shows countercyclical dispersion
in establishment-level TFP, the durable industries show stronger cyclicality and it is the rms at
bottom quantile of productivity distribution that drive the dispersion dynamics. In the theoretical
part, he steps away from uncertainty shocks and uses only preference shock of the representative
household as the driving force.
The upper panel of Figure (1) shows the co-movement of di¤erent business cycle indicators. In
particular, I claim that the average TFP is a valid aggregate state indicator for the manufacturing
sector. The correlation coe¢ cient between average TFP (HP ltered) and sectoral output (HP
ltered) is 0:86 with p-value of scale 10 9. The average TFP corresponds to the cyclical indicator
used through out the model, and the uctuation in it represents technology or productivity shock,
which drives the dynamics of model economy. Following Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) and Bloom
(2009), I use dispersion in cross-sectional TFP distribution at four digit SIC level to approximate
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that at the individual level, without arguing the validity of the approximation. The result is the
lower panel of Figure (1), illustrating countercyclical movement of variance in TFP.4 The precise
correlation coe¢ cients for the US manufacturing sector are documented in detail in both Bloom,
Floetotto and Jaimovich (2010) and Kehrig (2011), and are summarized in Table 1 together with
my own calculation.
Table 1. Correlations between Dispersion and Cyclical Indicator5
For US Manufacturing Sector GDP Growth GDP HP Res. Avg. TFP
Kehrig (2011)
(1) Estab. TFP, Std. Dev. -0.420 -0.528 
(Durables, HP Residual)
(2) Estab. TFP, Std. Dev. -0.172  
(Non-durables, HP Residual)
Bloom et. al. (2010)
(3) Estab. Output Growth, IQR -0.364  
(4) Estab. TFP Growth, Std. Dev. -0.273  
(5) Firm Sales Growth, IQR -0.265  
(6) Firm Stock Returns, IQR -0.339  
Calculated from NBER-CES MIPD
(7) Ind. TFP Growth, IQR -0.502 (0.000) -0.298 (0.021) -0.184 (0.108)
(8) Ind. TFP Growth, Std. Dev. -0.262 (0.038) -0.241 (0.051) -0.129 (0.194)
(9) Ind. TFP Growth, Var. -0.249 (0.046) -0.245 (0.048) -0.123 (0.206)
4I obtain data from the same sources as the aforementioned two papers, yet with more recent data up until
2005. I get the same signacantly negative correlations as in these two papers if I only use the same range of data
as they do. However, if I include the newly update data as shown in the gure, I can only a negative correlation
that is not signicant and is much smaller in absolue scale, which is less than 0.11.
5 The rst column of results show correlation coe¢ cients (p-value) with Real GDP growth rate, the second with
residuals of HP-ltered Real GDP, and the last with weighted average TFP growth rate in manufacturing sector.
Row (1) and (2) are taken from Table 3 and 4 in Kehrig (2011), in which the microlevel data sources are mainly
ASM/CM/LBD continuously covering period of 1972-2005 at annual frequency. Row (3) to (6) are from Table
1 in Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2010). Establishment-level data are also from ASM/CM/LBD, 1972-2006,
while the rm-level infomation is from Compustat at quarterly frequency, 1967:II-2008:III for sales growth and
1969:I-2010:III for stock returns. Row (7) to (9) are TFP dispersions cross industries at four digit SIC level and
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database is the source, covering annually 1959-2005. Except
for IQR, all other moments of industrial TFP growth are weighted by real value of total shipment. Numbers in
parentheses are one-sided p-values under the null of non-negative correlation.
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Due to the limitation of data, I use dispersion measures at TFP growth rate instead of TFP
level. The corresponding cyclical indicators are then GDP growth rate, sectoral output growth
rate, and average TFP growth rate. To be comparable to other works, I only include GDP growth
rate and GDP HP residuals in Table 1.
Firm Dynamics. To illustrate rm dynamics over time, I obtain annual data from 1977 to
2009 in Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) at CES, a data set that recently became publicly
accessible. To be consistent with micro-level evidence on countercyclical dispersion, I only look at
the establishments in manufacturing sector. 6
Table 2 summarizes the property of establishment entry and exit rates by rm size7. A rm
is classied to be small if it has less than 50 registered employees. A more detailed illustration of
entry and exit rates by year and by establishment size can be found in the Appendix.
6A noteworthy issue here is how to dene an entrant and an exiting establishment. According to the o¢ cial
overview of BDS dataset, "An establishment opening or entrant is an establishment with positive employment in
the current year and zero employment in the prior year. An establishment closing or exit is an establishment with
zero employment in the current year and positive employment in the prior year. The vast majority of establishment
openings are true greeneld entrants. Similarly, the vast majority of establishment closings are true establishment
exits (i.e., operations ceased at this physical location). However, there are a small number of establishments that
temporarily shutdown (i.e., have a year with zero employment) and these are counted in the establishment openings
and closings." Therefore, an inevitable caveat is that, although of relatively small number, an "idling" establishment
can show up in the data as exit rst, and then as entrant, for potentially many times. However, one clear advantage
especially over rm-level data is that merging and acquisition are not reasons for disappearing units. Therefore, I
can safely assume that exiting establishments su¤er from low realizations of productivity.
7The entry and exit rates are indeed calculated utilizing the numbers of new born establishments, closed es-
tablishments, and existing establishments. However, the size is classied using the number of employees in a rm,
instead of an establishment. One can only argue that large rms tend to own large establishments, and therefore
large establishments exhibit similar dynamics to the ones owned by large rms. Otherwise, it is not clear whether
this is a valid approximation.
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Table 2. Entry and Exit Rates in Manufactures8
For US Manufacturing Sector 1977-2009
Total Large Small
(1) Avg. Entry Rate (%) 9.36 5.18 31.18
(2) Avg. Exit Rate (%) 9.28 6.00 30.06
(3) Std. Dev. (EntryHP ) (%) 0.52 0.64 1.85
(4) Std. Dev. (ExitHP ) (%) 0.67 0.90 1.56
(5) Corr(EntryHP , (Avg. TFP)HP ) 0.20 (0.29) 0.19 (0.33) 0.21 (0.29)
(6) Corr(ExitHP , (Avg. TFP)HP ) -0.26 (0.17) -0.17 (0.37) -0.23 (0.24)
(5) Corr(Entry, Avg. TFP ) 0.22 (0.26) 0.13 (0.51) 0.31 (0.11)
(6) Corr(Exit, Avg. TFP) -0.10 (0.62) 0.06 (0.76) -0.06 (0.73)
Comparing establishment dynamics in small rms to that of large ones, they are of much larger
scales, more volatile, and more cyclical. Therefore, in the quantitative model, I only focus on the
dynamics in small rms, and treat the entry and exit of large rms mainly as exogenous, and they
happen only with small probability.
3 A Simple Model
To highlight the mechanism, I start from a simplied and tractable three period version of the
full model. I remove some features of the working model that is not as crucial, and focus only
on the incumbentsproblem. The main idea is that the option to exit promotes risk taking of
small rms by creating a local non-concavity in a rms continuation value function, which in turn
generates a non-degenerate dispersion in productivity. Moreover, as is shown in the comparative
statics analysis, such dispersion becomes larger in bad time, due to a larger fraction of risk taking
rms. The same mechanism drives the innite horizon model as well.
3.1 Setup
There are 3 periods, t = 0; 1; 2. The length of each period is taken as one year, same as the
period length in the full model. There are a continuum of risk neutral rm owners, each of whom
8 The data source is still BDS. The binary grouping rule in size can be found in caption of Figure (2). In Row
(1) and (2), the numbers are simple time series averages. Row (3) and (4) are standard deviations for HP residuals.
Row (5) to (6) are correlations for HP residuals, (7) and (8) are for changes. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values.
I choose to compute correlation coe¢ cient this way instead of using original entry/exit rates because there is a
declining trend in both series. This is an interesting observation on its own sake, but this paper is silent on it.
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Figure 2: Cyclical behavior of entry and exit in manufacturing sector by size. A small rm is
classied as one with less than 50 registered employees, and a large one with at least 50. This
gure shows original series of entry (solid lines) and exit (dashed lines) rates by size. The two
thinner lines at the bottom are for large rms, and the two thicker ones are for small rms. Data
on entry and exit rates are from BDS of CES.
owns a rm with di¤erent level of initial resource w0 2 [0; w]. Assume that each rm has only one
establishment or plant that produces one kind of product. The c.d.f. of ownersinitial resource
holding is given as G (w0). At period 0, initial wealth w0 can be divided into investment k0 for
future wealth and immediate consumption w0  k0. If an owner decides to invest k0, then she will
get w1 = F (Z; k) as period 1 wealth, where
F (Z; k) = Zk; 0 <  < 1;
and Z represents the realized productivity of the technology the rm owner chooses after invest-
ment decision. A production project is associated with a technology. An owner can choose one
and only one out of two available technologies: a safe one and a risky one, di¤ering in the riskiness
and realizations of productivity.9 For the safe technology, Z = A for sure, while for a risky one,
with probability p 2 (0; 1), Z = z > A, and with probability 1  p, Z = 0. Both technologies give
the same expected value of Z, that is, pz + (1  p) 0 = A. The risky technology has a variance in
productivity as a function of p and z, 2 (p; z) = p (1  p) z2. As a result of linearity of F (Z; k)
in Z, the expected return of risky project is the same as the safe one, i.e., there is no ex ante risk
premium. Under this setup, A corresponds to the average establishment-level TFP in data, and
plays the role of economic condition indicator (or cyclical indicator in the full model); the riskiness
of the risky technology represents the risk at the establishment level, while its aggregated coun-
terpart measures the dispersion in productivity. I assume that production requires full attention
9For tractability, I assume only one type of risky technology and binary possible realization of it. In fact, it is
possible to allow a continuous range of randomization, and this generalization does not alter the qualitative result.
9
Figure 3: Timing of the Simple Model
of the rm owner, hence a rm cannot undertake multiple production projects simultaneously.
3.2 Analysis
At period 1, after the uncertainty in Z realizes, the agent can decide whether to close her rm,
exit the industry and get outside option value V 0, or stay. Conditional on staying, she makes the
investment choice k1 and technology adoption choice again based on period 1 wealth w1. In the
last period, she simply consumes her nal wealth w2. The objective of an agent with initial wealth
w0 is to maximize her discounted consumption, with discount factor :
V0 (w0) = max
0k0w0
f(w0   k0) + max fV1 (Ak0 ) ; (1  p)V1 (0) + pV1 (zk0 )gg
where Vt (wt) is the time t value for an agent with wealth wt.
It is convenient to work backwards. At time t = 2;
V2 (w2) = w2:
At time t = 1, an agent with k1 > 0 will be indi¤erent between operating a safe project and a
risky one. Assume that all agents will perform safely in this case, which is consistent with their
choice if they were risk averse. For simplicity, I do not allow borrowing in the short model, and
the period 1 value for a staying rm will be:
V 11 (w1) = max
0k1w1
f(w1   k1) + Ak1 g :
Let k be the optimal capital choice without borrowing constraint. The value of a rm with wealth
level w1 at the beginning of period 1 will be given by
V1 (w1) = max

V 0; V 11 (w1)
	
:
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Figure 4: Continuation value as a functions of control variable, k0. The horizontal axis is k0,
and the vertical axis is the continuation value for each level of k0. The solid curve is the safe
continuation value V1 (Ak0 ), and the dashed curve is the risky continuation value (1  p)V1 (0) +
pV1 (zk

0 ). The horizontal line is V
0.
Let w1 be such that V
0 = V 11 (w

1) : Note that there is a kink at w

1 and V1 (w1) is convex in a
neighborhood of w1: This gives a rm with relatively low wealth level an incentive to take a risky
project before it enters period 1. At t = 0, a rm makes the investment decision and chooses a
technology:
V0 (w0) = max
0k0w0
f(w0   k0) + max fV1 (Ak0 ) ; (1  p)V1 (0) + pV1 (zk0 )gg
= max
0k0w0

(w0   k0) + max

V 0; V 11 (Ak

0 ) ; pV
1
1 (zk

0 ) + (1  p)V 0
		
:
To explicitly characterize a rms technology choice, it is useful to introduce the following
condition on parameters.
Condition 1. 0 < V 0 < 
22
1 2 
1+2
1 2 z
1
1 p
22
1 2 (p1+   p2) = (1  p) :
The risky and safe continuation values intersect at most once in the region where they are
both greater than V 0. This condition ensures the existence of intersection, and makes the analysis
tractable as shown in Proposition 1. The intuition is that given (z; p), the option value V 0 of
exiting cannot be too high, otherwise exit becomes very appealing, so does the risky technology.
If it is violated, then all staying rms strictly prefer the risky technology. In particular, if V 0 is
given, this happens when A is low enough.
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Proposition 1. At t = 0, if Condition 1 holds, then 9kI0 and kIII0 such that 0 < kI0 < kIII0 < k,
and the decision rule of a rm owner with initial wealth w0 will be one of the following:
1. If 0 < w0  kI0, she consumes all w0 and exits in period 1 for sure;
2. If kI0 < w0 < k
III
0 , she invests all w0 in a risky project, then with probability p, w1 = zk

0 ,
she in turn invests all w1 in period 1; with probability 1  p, w1 = 0, she exits in period 1;
3. If kIII0  w0  kA0 , she invests all w0 in a safe project, then invests all w1 = Ak0 in period
1;
4. If kA0 < w0  k, she invests all w0 in a safe project, then invests k and consumes the rest
in period 1;
5. If w0 > k, she invests k and consumes the rest in both periods.
The interesting region, or the "risky region", is the interval

kI0; k
III
0

. The exiting option
forms a lower bound in value function that is higher than in the case without exiting. This new
lower bound alters the shape of continuation value function, in particular, the continuation value
function has a local convexity if safe technology is chosen. This non-concavity region is roughly
the same as the interval

kI0; k
III
0

, in which rms have limited amount of capital stock. Firms
that fall into this region have incentive to smooth out such convexity by entering a lottery and
randomizing over possible outcomes, which is exactly the role that risky technology plays in this
model. The fraction of risk taking rms will then be determined given the initial distribution
G (w0), and each of these rms bear the same risk in terms of the randomness of productivity10.
As can be seen below, a change in A drives the changes in the risky region and the the fraction of
risk taking rms, and leads to a di¤erent productivity dispersion.
Assume a form of "Law of Large Numbers" holds11, meaning that there are many rms at
each w0, and the fraction of risky project with z realized is p. The ex ante aggregate variation in
TFP that rms choose to take in period 0, denoted as   (p), is dened as the average variance in
10Once again, the same risk results from the assumption that only one way of randomization is permitted in
the model for simplicity. To relax this restriction, one can assume that each rm can choose any distribution on
productivity so long as the expection remains A, which results in a risky region larger than

kI0 ; k
III
0

. However,
while making the model much more complicated, this will not alter the result qualitatively, neither will it provide
more insight into the model.
11See Judd (1985).
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protability as a function of p, the probability of good realization of risky technology.
  (p; z) =
Z
W
var (Z) dG (w0jk0 > 0)
=
Z kIII0
kI0
2 (p; z) dG (w0jk0 > 0)
= 2 (p; z)  (p; z) ;
where  (p; z) :=
G(kIII0 ) G(kI0)
1 G(kI0)
in which kI0 and k
III
0 are functions of p and z as well. 
2 (p; z)
is simply the variance of the Bernoulli distributed productivity of risky technology, while  (p; z)
represents the measure of rms in the risky region. At the same time, the aggregate or average
output in period 0, O (p; z), is:
O (p; z) =
Z
W
E (F (Z; k0)) dG (w0jk0 > 0)
= pz
Z k
kI0
w0 dG (w0jk0 > 0) + pz (k)
1 G (k)
1 G (kI0)
:
3.3 Comparative Statics
The nature of the simple model does not permit cyclical features. Therefore, I will instead
analyze the comparative statics mimicking di¤erent times of business cycles. In particular, I use
A, the average productivity, as the economic condition indicator, which corresponds to the average
TFP in data. In the model, a change in A can result from either a change in p, or in z, or in
both. Provided that the bad outcome of the risky technology is always zero, z then determines
the range, the variance of the Bernoulli productivity 2 (p; z), and the measure of risky region
 (p; z). At the same time, 2 (p; z) and  (p; z) are also nontrivial functions of p. When A, p,
and/or z changes, the resulting change in riskiness of a risky technology, that is, 2 (p; z) or range,
is called the "riskiness e¤ect", and the change in the measure of rms in the risky region,  (p; z),
is the "mean e¤ect". The interesting one is the mean e¤ect, therefore, to show the mechanism, I
consider a particular change in A, such that z is held unchanged and p is also controlled to fully
eliminate the riskiness e¤ect, and examine the resulting mean e¤ect.
Proposition 2. Let V 0 and z remain unchanged and assume Condition 1 always holds. Let
A 2 AH ; AL	 = pH z; pLz	, pH and pL be such that pH > pL > 0. Suppose the distribution of
initial wealth G () is Pareto and the lower bound of its support is below kI0 when risky technology
is pH . Then:
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Figure 5: Comparative Statistics.
1. O
 
pH ; z

> O
 
pL; z

;
2. 
 
pH ; z

< 
 
pL; z

:
To control the riskiness e¤ect, assume pH + pL = 1, then:
3. 2
 
pH ; z

= 2
 
pL; z

= z2pHpL;
4.  
 
pH ; z

<  
 
pL; z

:
According to this proposition, given z xed, A (or p) summarizes the aggregate state, higher
A then means good times. When the aggregate state is good, the total output is high, and this
is always the case whether the riskiness e¤ect is controlled or not. Meanwhile, the risky region is
smaller in good times, which in turn leads to smaller fraction of risk taking rms, regardless of
the riskiness e¤ect. The assumption of Pareto distribution is to mimic the actually observed size
distribution of rms, which is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for the desired change in
risky region. For example, a uniform distribution will give the same result. When the riskiness
e¤ect is controlled, the riskiness of a risky technology remains unchanged, therefore it is the
change in fraction of risk taking rms that drives the change in resulting productivity dispersion,
or average riskiness that rms choose to take, measured as variance in productivity. In fact, in
the calibrated quantitative model, it turns out that the riskiness e¤ect is too small to generate
signicant di¤erence in simulated results.
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Figure (5) illustrates what happens to the model if A decreases, as described in Proposition 2.
When A is low, the exiting threshold increases and more rms exit. At the same time, low A also
leads to a larger risky region and a greater fraction of risk taking rms, so now there are more rms
that strictly prefer to the risky technology. As a result, if the change in A is controlled as specied
before, the average risk that rms choose to take is also larger, so is the realized productivity
dispersion. To summarize, the key step for the model to generate countercyclical productivity
dispersion is the change in the risky region as aggregate state changes. And it is mainly because of
an enlarged fraction of risk taking rms that causes a larger productivity dispersion in bad times.
This mechanism remains in the quantitative model with innite horizon. In fact, if the aggregate
state follows a Markov process with only two possible outcomes of AH and AL controlled in a
similar way, then without introducing other features, the negative correlation between aggregate
state and productivity dispersion is still almost perfect.
4 Quantitative Model
4.1 Setup
Time is discrete, with innite horizon. The rms that have survived at least one period are
called incumbents. There is a continuum of potential entrant rms every period, each of whom
draws their initial capital k0 from a distribution G0 (k0). Once entering, an entrant acts as an
incumbent thereafter as long as this rm stays. The production function is the same as in the
simple model, F (Z; k) = Zk, with 0 <  < 1 and Z being the realized productivity depending on
technology choice.12 At the beginning of each period, all rms observe average productivity A. An
incumbent rm owner makes the choice between staying and exiting. If an incumbent exits, the
12In fact, F (Z; k) = Zk can be interpreted as a rms prot, that is, the revenue net of the cost for variable
factors, for example labor and materials. Specically, assume a plant faces an inverse demand function P (y) =
By b, and therefore its revenue becomes R (y) = By1 b. Suppose the actual production function is y = ~Ak~l~,
and the price for other factors is !, then after optimization of l, the revenue function becomes
R =

B ~A1 b
1=(~(1 b)) h
~ (1  b) =!
i~(1 b)=(~(1 b) 1)
k~(1 b)=(
~(1 b) 1);
and prot function
 =

1  ~ (1  b)

R:
Redening variables gives the form of Zk. Therefore, Z in the model is more appropriately interpreted as measured
productivity that includes information from the demand side, instead of actual productivity. For the same reason,
parameter A shown later in the model shall also be interpreted as aggregate state of the model economy, rather
than production technology.
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owner takes away the remaining prot. A staying rm then decides the amount of next periods
working capital k0 and whether to adopt the safe technology or the risky one. Again, assume full
attention of a rm owner as a prerequisite of production. After production, capital depreciates at
a random rate  2 f1; :::; Ng with probability  (i), i = 1; :::; N, which is assumed to be i.i.d.
across rms and over time. Technology choice, investment, and depreciation jointly determine the
incumbents next period disposable resource.
The aggregate state for the model economyA evolves as a Markov chain withA 2 A = fA1; :::; ANAg,
and transition probability ij = Pr (AjjAi). In particular, this Markov chain is a discretized AR(1)
process, such that At = AAt 1 + uut, where A 2 (0; 1) is the serial correlation, and ut is white
noise. Following conventional real business cycles models, I assume time invariant volatility in
A, in terms of constant u. This implies that the driving force of this modelled economy is the
traditional "technology shocks", that is, the change in "rst moment". This is di¤erent from
Bloom (2009) and Bloom et. al. (2010), who use time varying higher moments as the pure source
of aggregate uctuation. Meanwhile, this also distinct from, for example, Bechmann and Bayer
(2009a,b) and Chugh (2010), who allow time varying higher moments in addition to the usual rst
moment movement to account for the countercyclical dispersion observed in data. I do not allow
u to change over time is based on the following considerations that (1) u is time series volatility,
which is not the same as observed cross-sectional dispersion, and (2) this model emphasizes a
mechanism through which time varying A generates realized productivity dispersion, and it is of
no need to introduce additional variation.
Production is costly. In each period, a staying and active rm needs to pay a xed operating
cost, and, if the rm needs increase or decrease its capital stock, it pays a capital adjustment
cost as well. Mainly following Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Bloom (2009), I assume the
capital adjustment cost consists of two parts: (1) a non-convex cost, and (2) a transaction cost.
The non-convex cost represents the opportunity cost when a rm is under capital adjustment.
Specically, this rm foregoes a fraction ck of its production if there is capital adjustment in a
given period. The transaction cost represents the partial irreversibility. When a rm needs to
increase capital, the price paid for every unit of new capital is normalized to be one, where the
price is interpreted as how many units of output needed to get one unit of capital. However, if a
rm wants to reduce capital, the selling price for each unit of capital is  < 1.
Each time period has several stages, which resembles period 1 in the simple three period model.
 Stage 1: Observation of state variables. Aggregate state A realizes, so does the random
capital depreciation for each rm . An incumbent rm observes (A; ), and enters this
period with remaining capital, (1  ) k, and together with periods production F (Z 1; k),
where Z 1 is the realization of last periods productivity of this rm. A potential entrant
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draws k0 and observes A.
 Stage 2: Entry and exit. An entrant with (k0; A) enters if there is positive expected prot.
An incumbent exits either voluntarily based on continuation values, or exogenously with
probability .
 Stage 3: Investment and technology decision. Both staying incumbents and new born rms
decide how much to invest, and then choose between safe and risky technologies. At the
same time, the operating cost and capital adjustment cost are paid.
 Stage 4: Production. Production takes place in the form F (Z; k0), where k0 is the new
working capital, and Z is the productivity. If a rm chooses safe technology, then the
productivity is deterministic, Z = A. Otherwise, with probability p (A), the risky technology
turns out to be a success, Z = z, and with probability 1  p (A), it fails, and Z = 0.
4.2 Individual Decision
An Incumbents Problem. At the beginning of each period, an incumbent rm is characterized
by (Z 1; k; ; A), where Z 1 2 fA 1; 0; zg is the realized productivity of last period for a specic
rm, which can be either of the safe productivity A 1, the bad realization 0, or the good realization
z, k is the total amount of capital that was used in last period,  is the realized random depreciation
rate, and A represents the economic condition of current period.
The rst choice an incumbent rm owner makes is between keeping operating and closing the
rm and leaving.
V (Z 1; k; ; A) = max (1  )V 1 (Z 1; k; ; A) + V 0 (Z 1; k; ; A) ;
where  2 f; 1g is the exiting choice, and  is the exogenous exiting hazard. If a rm with
(Z 1; k; ; A) chooses to exit, the value is:
V 0 (Z 1; k; ; A) =  (A) (Z 1k + (1  ) k) ;
where  (A) < 1 is the fraction of resource a rm owner can take away when exiting, which is
actually a resale price and is potentially a function of A. If this rm chooses to stay, the owner
must then decide on investment, i, and technology choice, safe or risky. The capital stock evolves
as follows
k0 = (1  ) k + i;
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where, following Khan and Thomas (2008),  > 1 determines the growth rates on the balanced
growth path13. The operating cost C (i;Z 1; k; ; A) of a rm consists of a xed cost cf and a
capital adjustment cost:
C (i;Z 1; k; ; A) = cf + ckF (Z 1; k) 1fi6=0g + (1   (A)) ( i) 1fi<0g:
Actively adjusting capital stock and choosing i 6= 0, costs a rm ck fraction of its revenue from
last periods production. In addition, if a rm reduces its scale, it can only sell its current
capital possession at price  (A) < 1. Combining these pieces gives the ow prot of this rm
D (k0;Z 1; k; ; A) ; and
P (i;Z 1; k; ; A) = F (Z 1; k)  i  C (i;Z 1; k; ; A)  0:
I enforce non-negative prot as a constraint. The rm also has to choose between safe and risky
technology. A safe technology produces F (A; k0) for sure; while a risky technology results in
productivity at z with probability p (A) and 0 with 1   p (A). If the safe one is chosen, the rm
gets:
V 1safe (i; k; ; A) = EA0;0 [V (A; k0; 
0; A0) jA] ;
and likewise,
V 1risky (i; k; ; A) = p (A)EA0;0 [V (z; k0; 
0; A0) jA] + (1  p (A))EA0;0 [V (0; k0; 0; A0) jA] :
Therefore, conditional on staying, an incumbent rm solves the following maximization problem:
V 1 (Z 1; k; ; A) = max
i

P (i;Z 1; k; ; A) + max

V 1safe (k
0;Z 1; k; ; A) ; V 1risky (k
0;Z 1; k; ; A)
		
:
Denote the state variables of an incumbent as  = (Z 1; k; ; A) 2 	, with 	 being the set of
all possible states. Solution to an incumbents question with state  is a list of policy functions
f ( ) ;  ( ) ;  ( )g such that (1)  ( ) is the exiting choice,  : 	 ! f; 1g; and conditional on
surviving, (2)  ( ) is the technology choice,  : f 2 	 :  ( ) = g ! f0; 1g, where 0 represents
the safe technology and 1 the risky one, and (3)  ( ) is the investment level,  : f 2 	 :  ( ) = g
! R.
13This assumption is not crucial for generating countercyclical variance in productivity. The quantitative results
on countercyclicality does not alter if  = 1 as in standard business cycles models. The only reason of introducing
this parameter is to make the simulated model moments comparable to data moments. The average annual growth
rate of per capital output, assuming balanced growth path, is  = 1:016, which is not removed from the data
moments, especially those of investment dynamics.
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A Potential Entrants Problem. A potential entrant draws initial capital holding k0 from a
invariant Pareto distribution G0 (k0) with parameter . The value of staying outside the market is
V 00 (k0; A) =  (A) k0:
To start up a business, one must pay a setup cost ce from initial capital, and thereafter acts as an
incumbent with state (Z 1; k; ; A) being  0 = (0; (k0   ce) = (1  ) ; ; A), where, without loss of
generality,  = 0 := E (). Hence, the payo¤ of opening a rm will be:
V 10 (k0; A) = V
1 (0; (k0   ce) = (1  ) ; ; A) :
A new rm will be born if
V 10 (k0; A) > V
0
0 (k0; A) :
Solution to this problem is a binomial entry choice " : 	0  	 ! f0; 1g, where 	0 contains all
possible  0, and " ( 0) = 1 if an entrant enters and 0 otherwise.
4.3 Aggregate Dynamics
Given the solutions to the individual problems described before, f () ;  () ;  () ; " ()g, it is
straightforward to write down the transition dynamics for the distribution over  = (Z 1; k; ; A) :
For an arbitrary  2 	, it is either  2 	0 or  can only be the state of an incumbent.
I denote  ( ) as the measure or density of point  = (Z 1; k; ; A) at Stage 1 of a typical
period with aggregate state A, before entry and exit takes place. If  ( ) = 1, then a rm
with this state exits for sure, and no other transition can happen. If  ( ) = , then with
probability  this rm exogenously exits, and with a complementary probability, it stays. Con-
ditional on staying, if the rm chooses the safe technology,  ( ) = 0, then with probability
 (0) its individual state becomes (A; (k +  ( )) =; 0). On the other hand, if the rm chooses
the risky technology,  ( ) = 1, then with probability p (A) (0) its individual state becomes
(z; (k +  ( )) =; 0), and with probability (1  p (A)) (0) it becomes (0; (k +  ( )) =; 0). Now
turn to the new borns. Denote g0 ( 0) the entrants measure or density at point  0 determined
by G0 (). A new born with  0 enters if " ( 0) = 1. After entering, this rm acts exactly the
same as a surviving incumbent with  =  0. To summarize, starting from  ( ), a fraction
 ( ) ( ) exits, (1   ( )) (1   ( )) (0) ( ) goes to individual state (A; (k +  ( )) =; 0),
(1   ( ))  ( ) p (A) (0) ( ) goes to (z; (k +  ( )) =; 0), and the rest to (0; (k +  ( )) =; 0);
starting from g0 ( 0), (1   ( )) (0) g0 ( 0) goes to (A; (k +  ( 0)) =; 0),  ( ) p (A) (0) g0 ( 0)
goes to (z; (k +  ( 0)) =; 
0), and the rest to (0; (k +  ( 0)) =; 
0). Finally, the aggregate states
becomes A0 with probability Pr (A0jA), A0 2 A. Formally, suppose the aggregate state at Stage 1
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of a period is A0 = Aj, and that of last period is A = Ai, meaning the realized productivity Z is
one of fAi; z; 0g. Every state not on the realization path has zero measure, or
0 (A; k0; 0; A0) = 0 if A 6= Ai or A0 6= Aj;
where primed variables are ones realized at the same period as A0. The rest of the states can then
be divided into three groups by realization of Z, all of which come from both incumbents and new
borns. For Z = Ai,
0 (Ai; k0; 
0; Aj) =  (
0)
" R
(1   ( )) (1   ( ))1f :k0=(1 )k+( )g ( ) d 
+
R
" ( 0) (1   ( 0))1f 0:k0=(1 0)k0+( 0)gg0 ( 0) d 0
#
;
where variables with no prime are ones observed one period back, with  = (Z 1; k; ; Ai) and
 0 = (0; (k0   ce) = (1  0) ; 0; Ai). For Z = z or 0,
0 (fz; 0g ; k0; 0; Aj) =  (0)
" R
(1   ( ))  ( )1f :k0=(1 )k+( )g ( ) d 
+
R
" ( 0)  ( 0)1f 0:k0=(1 0)k0+( 0)gg
0 ( 0) d 0
#
:
By independence, a fraction p (Ai) has Z = z, and the rest gets Z = 0, that is,
0 (z; k0; 0; Aj) = p (Ai)
0 (fz; 0g ; k0; 0; Aj) ;
0 (0; k0; 0; Aj) = (1  p (Ai))0 (fz; 0g ; k0; 0; Aj) :
The di¢ culty in obtaining a closed form transition function is due to the aggregate uctuation
in A, therefore I turn to numerical solutions. In the following subsection, I rst pick the parameter
values that generate reasonable moments when the model is simulated at a stationarity. The
stationarity here means the following. The aggregate state sequence, fAtg, is set to be constant
at its mean, but the rms still expect the future states to be changing according to a transition
probability of A, ij. At the same time, the time-moving average inow and outow of the pool
of incumbents roughly equal. Then, leaving all parameters unchanged, I simulate a long sequence
of fAtg that actually evolves following ij, and throw away the rst burnt-in periods. It is now
that I can look at the generated correlations and other business cycles features of the model.
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4.4 Quantitative Results
Table 3. Parameter Values and Rationale
Parameters Explanation
Aggregate Fluctuation
z = 1 Normalization
A Tauchen (1986). NA = 5;E (A) = 0:5; A = 0:9; " = 0:1
Production
 = 0:5 Capital share
 = 0:9 Discount factor
 Random depreciation rate, with E () = 0:1.
 = 0:6 Resale price, temporarily assumed to be constant.
 = 0:05 Exogenous exiting probability
cf = 0:2 Fixed cost
ck = 0:05 Capital adjustment cost as fraction of revenue
 = 1:016 Growth rate on the balanced growth path
Entrants
ce = 0:01 Entry cost
 = 0:3 Pareto distribution parameter for G0
For the purpose of an illustration, I set the parameters as are described in Table 3. In order
to set up a baseline for the model, I shut down the uctuation and simulate a long history of the
model under the selected parameter values. Specically, the realization of A is controlled to be
its mean level through the whole history, while all rms actually expect aggregate uctuation in
At with transition probabilities ij. To make sure the scale of the economy is not exploding or
shrinking, I let the number of new born rms and that of exiting rms be balanced such that
the time-moving average of entry and exit rates are roughly the same. The simulated sequence is
then truncated to remove the burnt-in stage. The generated moments and data counterparts are
listed in Table 4. The moments on investment dynamics are from Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006),
average entry and exit rates are taken from Table 2.
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Table 4. Moments from Model
Moments Generated from Model Data Moments
Investment
Mean of investment rate 0.166 0.122
Fraction of inaction 0.090 0.081
Fraction with positive investment 0.816 0.815
Fraction with positive investment burst 0.106 0.18
Fraction with negative investment burst 0.088 0.018
Entry and Exit
Mean entry rate 0.086 9.36
Mean exit rate 0.086 9.28
Productivity
Mean of productivity, A 0.5 
Productivity dispersion, Std. Dev. of Z 0.17 
Firm Size Reshu­ e
Fraction of large-to-small tbd tbd
Fraction of small-to-large tbd tbd
The main goal of this numerical exercise is to generate countercyclical rm-level productivity
dispersion as a result of rms risk taking behavior, without introducing any time varying volatility
in the driving force, At. I add the aggregate uctuation by simulating a sequence of realizations
of productivity level A, and let the model evolves accordingly without changing other parameter
values. The uctuation in productivity A follows the Markov process specied in the Table 3,
and not surprisingly, it is positively correlated with the total output with correlation coe¢ cient
0:78 (p-value = 1.5e-41). Therefore, the cross-sectionally averaged productivity can serve as a
valid cyclical indicator. The measures for productivity dispersion are chosen to be (1) standard
deviation of cross-sectional distribution of realized Z, productivity, (2) fraction of rms that prefer
risky technology, and (3) the 95% to 5% interpercentile range of realized Z, which is the value of
Z at 95% percentile minus the value of Z at 5% percentile.
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Figure 6: Simulated sequences of (1) cross sectional productivity dispersion measured as standard
deviation in realized productivity Z (solid line, left axis), and (2) fraction of rms that choose
risky technology (dotted line, right axis, in %). The grey bars indicate the economic condition as
value of A. In particular, darker bars represent lower values of A.
Figure 7: Simulated sequences of entry and exit rates. The solid line represents the exit rates, and
the dashed line records entry rates. Grey bars indicate the value of A as in previous gure.
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Table 5. Generated Cyclicality
Cyclicality: Correlations (p-value) with Cyclical Indicators
Cyclical Indicators
Variables of Interests Avg. Productivity, A Total Output, O
Productivity Dispersion std:dev: (Z) -0.385 (1.6e-8) -0.374 (4.7e-8)
Frac. of Risky Firms  -0.389 (1.2e-8) -0.372 (5.3e-8)
Interpercentile Range 95%-5% IPR955 -0.273 (8.6e-5) -0.26 (1.7e-4)
Entry Rate rEN 0.495 (8.1e-14) -0.096 (0.174)
Exit Rate rEX -0.386 (1.5e-8) -0.562 (0)
The correlation coe¢ cients of productivity dispersion is signicantly negative, and the absolute
values are in line with the data counterparts. Moreover, the cyclicality of productivity dispersion
measured is in comparable scale to that of the fraction of rms that choose risky technology, and
the movements are in very similar patterns as can be read o¤ from Figure (6). This implies that it
is the change in fraction of risk taking rms that drives the cyclicality of productivity dispersion. In
bad times, more rms are willing to take the risk and randomize their future values. Consequently,
the resulting dispersion measured as standard deviation of cross-sectional productivity distribution
is larger, so is the interpercentile range.14 The assumed binomial outcome of a risky technology
has the potential to impact the behavior of the dispersion, however, such impact is of a much
smaller scale and does not alter the main pattern.
5 Discussions and Extensions
The Case with Heterogeneity. I have assumed a common risk-free productivity level for all
rms in each period. In order for this paper to be comparable to models of heterogeneous rms
with idiosyncratic productivity change, one option is to simulate it many times using di¤erent
14Due to the model assumption, cross-sectional IPR in productivity can only be either z, z At, or At, and does
not have very interesting dynamics, although it is still countercyclical. This can be overcome by allowing a richer
set of productivity lotteries and keeping the expected productivity to be A. For example, in addition to (p (A) ; z),
rms can also choose any (p; zA) pair with binary outcomes such that pzA = A. Intuitively, the IPR measure in
this case will again be negatively correlated to At because smaller rms have incentive to take even more risk in
bad times than in the original case. Therefore, the range of realized productivities is wider, and potentially the
IPR is larger and has more possible values.
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but correlated processes of A, and then combined the results. This practice will not result in an
essentially di¤erent relationship between productivity dispersion and cyclical indicators.
The Case with Collateralized Borrowing Constraints. Firms are not allowed to raise fund
externally in this model. However, the qualitative result will be the same if rms can borrow
and are subject to collateralized borrowing constraints against capital stocks. It is still the small
rms that will be constraint. Consequently, small rms choose the risky technology, and they
need to bear both the riskiness in the random productivity realizations and the default risk. The
cyclical pattern therefore remains. Moreover, tighter borrowing constraint in bad times acts as an
amplication device in the resulting productivity dispersion. In fact, the tightness of the constraint
moves in the same direction as productivity dispersion, with or without aggregate state controlled.
The Case in General Equilibrium. To mimic the case of general equilibrium, especially the
change in prices, I set the capital resale price  as an increasing function of A. When the economy
is in better condition, a rm can sell its capital stock at a higher price. This modication can be
supported by empirical nding by Balasubramania and Sivadasan (2009), who nd positive corre-
lation between capital resalability and mean of productivity distribution, and negative correlation
between capital resalability and productivity dispersion across industries at four digit SIC level.
Such modication impacts the model economy by directly a¤ecting the entry and exit decisions
through the option values of not entering or exiting, which in turn may change the risk taking
behavior of the marginal rms. Intuitively, whether partial equilibrium results can survive, espe-
cially the cyclicality, depends on two forces in opposite directions of this modication. The rst
force in favor of the cyclicality result is due to the local non-concavity in rms value function.
Higher  at higher A results in higher curvature in the value function and a smaller region for risk
taking. Lower  has the opposite e¤ect. The other force is twofold. For incumbents,  moving
in the same direction as A increases the option value of exiting in good times and decreases it
otherwise, therefore it promotes risk taking in good times and depresses it in bad times. For en-
trants, it also leads to a higher option value of not entering the market and reduces the incentive
of opening new rms. The simulation suggests that the rst force dominates the other one, and
the countercyclicality actually becomes more pronounced in this case.
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Table 6. Generated Cyclicality when  =  (A)
Cyclicality with Fluctuations in Capital Resale Price
Cyclical Indicators: Corr (A;O) = 0:71
Variables of Interests Avg. Productivity, A Total Output, O
Productivity Dispersion std:dev: (Z) -0.441 -0.601
Frac. of Risky Firms  -0.441 -0.598
Entry Rate rEN 0.708 0.038
Exit Rate rEX -0.359 -0.576
6 Conclusion
Empirical works have shown that dispersion in rms protability measured as the second
moment of rm level TFP evolves countercyclically over time. I explore a mechanism in which the
time-varying and countercyclical second moment is a natural result of the standard rst moment
change. I incorporate rmstechnology adoption decision into rm dynamics model with business
cycle features to explain these empirical ndings both qualitatively and quantitatively. The option
of endogenous exiting and credit constraint jointly play an important role in motivating rmsrisk
taking behavior. The model predicts that relatively small sized rms are more likely to take risk,
and that the dispersion measured as the variance/standard deviation of rm-level protability is
larger in recessions, which are consistent to the data.
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